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Creating an International Criminal
Court: Confronting the Conflicting
Criminal Procedures of Iran and the
United States
Rose Marie Karadsheh*
I.

Introduction

The 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing, China, brought to the forefront of international
attention the difficulty of attaining a unified transnational effort to
condemn and punish world-wide injustices. Most are familiar with
the trying of war criminals, such as current attempts to bring to
justice leaders of the Bosnian Serbs. Unknown to most, however,
is the long history of attempts to establish an international criminal
court (ICC) to try those accused of crimes, not traditionally defined
as war crimes. This article discusses the evolution of the ICC and
whether such a court is a realistic option for nations concerned with
enforcing criminal justice against transnational criminals. For an
ICC to exist and be successful, there must be international support.
Therefore, the intent of the drafters must be to create a court and
procedures that are acceptable to the nations of the world.
However, there are many different policies and ideologies
governing criminal justice systems in every country. Two countries
with differing foundations for criminal justice are Iran and the
United States.
Iran is considered one of the most ardent Islamic systems for
criminal law and procedure. Iranian judges are primarily religious
clerics interpreting "God's will." In contrast, the United States
maintains a secular and diverse criminal justice system. U.S. laws
and procedures are likely the most developed and detailed in the
* Graduate of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan receiving
her Bachelor of Arts in Near East and North African Studies. She also received
her Juris Doctorate from Temple University School of Law in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Ms. Karadsheh is currently practicing at MacDonald and Goren,
P.C. in Birmingham, Michigan.
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world. When drafters for an ICC begin creating a proposal, they
must keep in mind very different systems, such as Iran and the
United States. As a result, a primary concern for drafters of an
ICC must be how to reconcile conflicting principles and procedures
that exist between such countries. Further, the drafters of an ICC
must consider whether countries are willing to compromise or
eliminate protections offered to their citizens, if their citizens are
tried in an international forum.
Part II of this article presents the history of the ICC and Part
III presents an analysis of a draft proposal for an ICC. The
analysis focuses primarily on the structure of such a court, the
pretrial process, the trial process and the procedural rights for a
defendant in that court. Part IV summarizes the same aspects in
the criminal justice system in Iran, and Part V compares and
contrasts the criminal justice system proposed by one draft with the
systems in Iran and the United States.
II.
A.

History of International Code and Court Drafts
History of The InternationalCriminal Code

Generally, international criminal law has developed on an ad
hoc basis and includes over 300 instruments evolving over the past
175 years.1 These instruments, known as treaties,. define international crimes and place a duty upon participating states to criminalize the conduct proscribed by the treaties. Such state action
includes the prosecution of accused offenders, punishing those
convicted, or extraditing the accused to another state willing to
prosecute.2
International criminal law in the nineteenth century began with
transnational cooperation for the return of fugitives (such as fleeing
thieves and murderers) to justice.' Eventually, agreements in
multilateral treaties encouraged nations to cooperate with law
enforcement of various nations to combat international crimes that
For
were considered societal ills of international concern.'

1. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 28 (1987);

Robert A. Freidlander, The Foundationsof InternationalCriminalLaw: A PresentDay Inquiry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13, 17 (1983).
2. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 53.
3. Roger S. Clark, Crime: The UN Agenda on InternationalCooperation in
the CriminalProcess, 15 NOVA L. REV. 475, 47.7 (1991).
4. Id.
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example, as early as 1815, treaties existed to abolish slave trade.5
Later treaties included: abolishing the trade in women and
children; 6 trade in obscene publications;7 forgery of currency;' and
trade in illicit drugs.9

International criminal laws continued to develop in the
twentieth century to include "more politically charged items" such
as: genocide;
13

°

war crimes;" apartheid;"

and terrorist offens-

es.

In spite of numerous -treaties, however, few countries systematically supported such treaties. Thus, these countries became safe
havens for transnational criminals.14

Furthermore, sanction

mechanisms against countries were nonexistent except for the
language in certain treaties which stated the maxim of aut dedere
aut punire.1 5

Other weaknesses in international law are described by Law
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni:

5. See, e.g., Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave
Trade, Feb. 8, 1815, 2 Martens Nouveau Recueil de Traites 432; Clark, supra note
3, at 477.
6. See, e.g., International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave
Traffic," Mar. 18, 1904, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
7. See, e.g., Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene
Publications, May 4, 1910, 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil General de Traites (ser.3)
266; Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
8. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting
Currency and Protocol, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 371; Clark, supra note 3, at
477.
9. See, e.g., International Opium Convention, Jan 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187;
Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
10. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Clark, supra note
3, at 477.
11. Geneva Conventions of 1949; Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
12. InternationalConvention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973); Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
13. For example, terrorist offenses such as hijacking, attacks on diplomats, and
taking of hostages. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Convention on the Preventionand
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
DiplomaticAgents, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 146,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); InternationalConvention Against the Taking of Hostages,
G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); Clark, supra note 3, at 477.
14. Clark, supra note 3, at 476.
15. "extradite or prosecute"
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(1) [I]t places the sole duty on states to act in conformity with
treaty obligations,
(2) it provides no authoritative control of the states to insure
compliance,
(3) it fails to provide a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts
that emerge between states,
(4) it fails to provide safeguards for those individuals who are
the object of such cooperative undertaking between states,
(5) it does not have an overall framework,
(6) it does not have standard or general rules for the drafting
of its specific proscriptions,
(7) it has no uniform standards or general rules applicable to
the specific provisions of the system to insure compliance by
enforcing agents, and
(8) its application and enforcement is uneven and subject to
those domestic political considerations affecting the enforcing
agent. 16
One proposal, drafted in 1954, was created to correct perceived
failures in international criminal law. The "Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind," was created by an
United Nations appointed committee, the International Law
Commission (ILC).17 The creation of an international criminal
court accompanying this code was intended to provide an effective
international enforcement mechanism.1 8 However, the states
involved never agreed on the draft
code or court due to disagree19
ment over its textual language.
As a result of these failed attempts at adopting a code of
offenses or a court, countries entered into numerous treaties that
stressed greater international cooperation.2' The primary focus of
these treaties were in the areas of drug offenses, economic crimes,
and terrorism.2 1 The most far-reaching treaty was the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-

16. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 53.
17. Friedlander, supra note 1, at 17; William N. Gianaris, The New World
Order and The Need for An InternationalCriminalCourt, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
88, 95 (1992). For a discussion on the evolution of an international criminal court,
see infra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 8; Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an
International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 227 (1992);
Gianaris, supra note 17, at 95
20. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 53; Gianaris, supra note 17, at 95.
21. Gianaris, supra note 17, at 96.
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tropic Substances.22 This treaty required signatory states to
criminalize a number of drug related offenses, assist in criminal
However, enforceinvestigations, and extradite, if necessary.'
evidenced by the
as
ment of such treaties has been inadequate,
24
growth in narcotics trafficking and use.
There are also several treaties employed in the fight against
economic crimes, including investment scams, money counterfeiting,
and money laundering.' These treaties may require the cooperation of several nations as the world economy grows more interdependent.2 6 Nevertheless, many of these treaties have not been
ratified and several gaps in these treaties deter international
cooperation.27
Additionally, treaties against terrorism have existed since the
1970s, yet have had little effect because signatory nations have not
complied with the terms.' However, examples such as Libya's
release of individuals accused of bombing the 1988 Pan Am Flight
103 may prove there is some strength in the enforcement of these
treaties.29
In the last ten years, proposals have again arisen attempting to
solve inadequacies of the current multilateral enforcement
mechanisms. These proposals include codifying multinational
treaties into one code and creating a court for uniform enforcement.3" The focus of this article is not on the international code's

22. U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/15, rev. 1, Dec. 19, 1988., reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
493 (1989).
23. Id.; see also Gianaris, supra note 17, at 98.
24. Gianaris, supra note 17, at 99. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy
Considerationson Inter-State Cooperation in CriminalMatters, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L
L. 123 (1992).
25. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an
InternationalCriminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 155 (1992); Gianaris, supra note 17, at 101.
26. Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 25, at 155.
27. Gianaris, supra note 17, at 103.
28. Id. at 104. See generally Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 25, at 156.
29. Id.
30. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 54; Draft Articles on the Draft Code of
Crimes Against The Peace and Security of Mankind, Sept. 11, 1991, reprinted in
30 I.L.M. 1584 [hereinafter Draft Code]. See generally 2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 516-547 (1980) [hereinafter FERENCZ,
INTERNATIONAL COURT]; Benjamin B. Ferencz, An InternationalCriminalCode
and Court: Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Ferencz, International Code]; Gianaris,
supra note 17, at 108-111; Bernhard Graefrath, UniversalCriminalJurisdictionand
an International Criminal Court, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 67 (1990); John W. Rolph,
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proposed drafts, but on the proposed drafts for a court. Nevertheless, a general overview of the latest official draft for an international code is necessary to better understand the purpose of the
court.
Since the first draft of an international criminal code in 1954,
the ILC has made slow progress in formulating a draft code,
including reports from 1982-1984 and 1985-1986.31 Further, critics
claim that the ILC has not sufficiently solved the problems
associated with the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials, including an
absence of clearly defined offenses, elements, and sanctions.32
However, in 1991, the 43rd session of the ILC developed what has
been described as a promising draft code.3 3 This draft, among
other things, criminalizes offenses such as: the recruitment, use,
financing, and training of mercenaries; 34 committing or ordering
acts of international terrorism; 35 engaging in illicit traffic of
narcotic drugs; 36 and any willful and severe damage to the environment.37 Professor John W. Rolph, described the ILC's efforts
as having "capitalized on the changing world order that has created
an environment in which consensus on an international criminal
code is possible."38 While this code can be used without an
international criminal court, critics claim that problems of uniformity will continue to exist without an international court enforcing the
international code.39
B. History of the InternationalCriminal Court
The creation of an international tribunal largely coincided with
the need to try persons accused of war crimes or military crimes
against civilians. One of the first cited international tribunals to
try individuals dates back to 1474 at the trial of Peter Von
Hagenbush for crimes against "God and man" during his military
occupation of a civilian community in Austria.' After World War
Perfecting an InternationalCode of Crimes, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 528 (1992).
31.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 10.

32. Id.
33. Rolph, supra note 30, at 528.
34. Draft Code, supra note 30, at 1591.
35. Id. at 1592.
36. Id. at 1593.
37. Id.
38. Rolph, supra note 30, at 528.

39. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 53; Gianaris, supra note 17, at
105-09.
40. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 2; Cavicchia, supra note 19, at 224; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an InternationalCriminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L
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I, the first proposal for an international criminal tribunal emerged
at the Paris Peace Conference in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.
While this tribunal was never established, its stated primary
purposes were to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for the "supreme
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties"
and for an international tribunal to try German war criminals."
Despite the failure to establish this tribunal for war crimes,
organizations such as the International Law Association (ILA)
continued to support the establishment of an international criminal
tribunal.42 For example, the ILA endorsed its first draft statute
in 1926 to correct perceived failures in the 1919 proposed draft
tribunal.43
Not only was there sustained support for an international
criminal court, but a more expansive view of the purpose of the
court was taken in 1937 after the assassinations of King Alexander
I of Yugoslavia and French Prime Minister Louis Barthou." The
League of Nations adopted a Convention Against Terrorism, which
included a statute for an International Criminal Tribunal.45
However, because of the ineffectiveness of this organization and
the outbreak of World War II, the Convention failed.'
After World War II the London Charters of 1945 and 1946
created the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East.47 These Tribunals were held in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Questions arose
regarding the fairness of prosecuting defendants in light of ill-

& CoMP. L. REV. 1 (1991).
41. Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 1; Germans criticized the criminal proceedings
because they were only directed against them and did not apply to the Allies who
also committed war crimes. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 2.
42. Report of the Permanent InternationalCriminal Court, International Law
Association, 34th Conference, Vienna, Aug. 5 - Aug. 11, 1926, reprinted in 1
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 252 (1980); see
also Cavicchia, supra note 19, at 225.
43. Cavicchia, supra note 19, at 225.
44. Id.; Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 4.
45. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, League
of Nations, Nov. 1, 1937, reprinted in FERENCZ, supra note 42, at 376.
46. India was the only country to ratify this Convention. See Bassiouni, supra
note 40, at 4.
47. See THE TOKYO JUDGEMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST, 29 APR. 1946 - 12 Nov. 1948 (B. Roling & C. Ruter eds.,
1977), reprintedin FERENCZ, supra note 42, at 507; Trial of War Criminal Before
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Oct. 1946 Apr. 1949, reprinted in FERENCZ, supra note 42, at 487.
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defined offenses, elements, and sanctions under international
law. 48 However, the war crimes trials proceeded.
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly requested the
ILC to study the possibility of establishing an international court to
try those charged with genocide and other crimes.49 These other
crimes included a number of multilateral treaties established to
combat non-war transnational crimes.5° A special committee of
the United Nations reviewed the reports from the ILC and
submitted a draft proposal to the United Nations General Assembly in 1951. A revised draft was submitted in 1953.51
According to the 1953 revised draft, the court would maintain
jurisdiction over an individual only if the state instituting the
proceedings confers jurisdiction upon the court over the offenses
53
involved. 2 The court could set bail and issue arrest warrants.
States could assist the court in investigations or retrieving evidence. 4 A prosecuting attorney would be appointed to file an
indictment 5 and a five member committee would then determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to proceed.56 The defendant would be accorded many rights equivalent to United States
constitutional rights, except the right to a jury trial.57
However, because of the inability of the General Assembly to
agree on what constituted an act of "aggression," which was made
illegal in the draft, work on the draft was extensively delayed.

48. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 9; Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on
the Need for an InternationalCriminal Court, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 135,
138 (1991).
49. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 4; Cavicchia, supra note 19, at 227; Scharf,
supra note 48, at 139.
50. For a discussion on the evolvement of multinational treaties and its
eventual inclusion in many draft code proposals for international criminal tribunal,
see infra notes 1-40 and accompanying text.
51. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N.
GAOR 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952), reprinted in FERENCZ,
INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 30, at 337 [hereinafter 1951 ILC Draft];
Report of the Committee on InternationalCriminalJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR 9th
Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954), reprinted in FERENCZ, INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 30, at 429 [hereinafter 1953 ILC Draft].
52. See 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 51.
53. Id.

54. Id.
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57.
at 94.

See 1953 ILC Draft, supra note 51. See generally Gianaris, supra note 17,
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"Aggression" was finally defined in 1973, however, the General
Assembly continued to table a vote on establishing a tribunal. 8
Finally, in 1990 and 1991, the United Nations General
Assembly indicated that the ILC could research what support an
international criminal court would have among nations.59 At the
44th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1992, the
ILC concluded the analytical phase of its work and required a new
mandate from the General Assembly to proceed with drafting a
statute for an international criminal court. 60
From this report, issued in 1992, the ILC indicated four major
positions countries held on establishing an international criminal
court. The first position was that most states supported the
mandate to draft a statute for a court and to eventually establish
such a court. 61 Second, a substantial number of courts supported
the creation of a new draft but reserved opinion on establishing a
court until the draft was complete.62 Third, some states, including
the United States, did not oppose a mandate to new draft statutes,
but did request that states have the opportunity to submit com63
ments and recommendations on the structure of the court.
Finally, a few countries questioned the feasibility of establishing
such a court.' The main concerns regarding the feasibility of
establishing the court were: the loss of state sovereignty, including
the reluctance of states to relinquish their national criminal
jurisdiction; the unlikelihood that states would confer jurisdiction
to an international court over military officers who were often the
perpetrators of international crimes; and the establishment of
universally acceptable rules of criminal law and procedure in light
of the diversity of national criminal laws and underlying policies.65
Since this ILC report, many unofficial proponents supporting
the establishment of an international criminal code and an ICC
have described the need for a court as "indispensable., 66 As the
world becomes more interdependent and more concerned with

58. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 8; Gianaris, supra note 17, at 94; Cavicchia,
supra note 19, at 228.
59. G.A. Res. 46/54, para. 3 (Dec. 1991), excerpt reprinted in 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 138 (1993).
60. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Ses., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/47/Sr.20-30 (1992).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/47/SR.20-30 (1992).
66. Cavicchia, supra note 19, at 233.
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similar problems of criminality, greater cooperation is required of
nations. 7 Many prominent leaders in the United States Congress
are calling for the United States to pursue the establishment of an
international criminal court in order to deal more effectively with
crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking.' For example, with
the strong support of Senator Arlen Spector, the United States
Congress passed a bill declaring "the United States should explore
the need for the establishment of an international criminal court on
a universal or regional basis to assist the international community
in dealing more effectively with criminal acts defined in international conventions . . .. 6 Many other proponents state that the
court should provide a neutral, international forum for prosecuting
international criminals, thus avoiding the ad hoc problems resulting
from multilateral cooperation. 0
III. The Drafts of an International Criminal Tribunal
The modern-day draft proposals for an ICC and international
criminal code are based upon the need for uniform treatment of
numerous multilateral treaties. 71 Accordingly, multilateral international treaties define "international criminal law." The ICC and
the international criminal code are intended to provide the
mechanisms to enforce and adjudicate violations of international
criminal law. This section describes drafters' proposals for defining
international criminal law: the purpose and establishment of the
ICC, including the organization and trial proceedings; and the
international criminal code, including the elements of the crime,
penalties, exoneration and the rights of the accused. Drafts have
been proposed for an ICC and international criminal code by a
number of sources. 72 However, because of the thoroughness of
67.

Bassiouni & Blakesley, supra note 25, at 155.

68. John B. Anderson, An InternationalCriminalColrt - An Emerging Idea,
15 NOVA L. REV. 433, 447 (1991); Scharf, supra note 48, at 143 (citing numerous
efforts by United States Congressmen to encourage the United States to pursue

the establishment of an international criminal court).
69. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-513, § 599E, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 1979, 2066.
70. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 53; Gianaris, supra note 17, at 109.
71. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
72. For latest official draft see, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.488 (1993). Because of
the limited availability of the latest draft, the official text will not be discussed.
See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/NGO 7, Draft Statute: InternationalCriminal
Tribunal (1990) reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REV. 375 (1991); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC/22 CRP.19/REV.1 (1980), reprinted in Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the
Establishment of an InternationalCourt for the Implementation of the Apartheid
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the draft by international scholar M. Cherif Bassiouni, this draft
serves, for purposes of this Article, as the primary example of an
ICC draft proposal.73
A. Defining InternationalCriminal Law
Bassiouni provides twenty-two categories of international
crimes which have evolved over a period of time, namely, from
1815 to 1984.74 As stated in Part II, the evolution of these
multilateral agreements was not systematic, but ad hoc, based upon
historical circumstances. 7 Bassiouni lists 312 conventions under
22 categories of crimes. The categories are:
1) Aggression,7 677
2) War Crimes,

Convention and Other Relevant InternationalInstruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523

(1981).
For drafts by private organizations see, BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 69 (the
U.N. 1990 and 1981 drafts listed were largely influenced by this draft); Draft

Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry and a Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, International Law Association, 60th
Conference, Montreal, Aug. 29 - Sept. 1, 1984, in Report of the 60th Conference
of the International Law Association (1983) [hereinafter 1983 ILA Draft]; Draft
Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry and a Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, International Law Association 61st
Conference, Paris, Aug. 26 - Sept.1, 1984, in Report of the 61st Conference of the
International Law Association (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ILA Draft]; AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(1991); DraftStatutefor an InternationalCriminalCourt, in FOUNDATION FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Wingspread

Conference, Sept. 1971); Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, in
WORK PAPER, ABIDJAN WORLD CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH

LAW, Aug. 26-31 (1973); TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT (J. Stone & R. Woetzel eds.,)(contains draft statute).
73. In accompanying notes to the Bassiouni draft, references to the ILA drafts
will be made occasionally to compare a different approach.
74. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 30. The International Law Association's (ILA)
Draft differs from Bassiouni's in that it only includes "non-political" treaties,
specifically excluding the use of "aggression" as an international offence. The ILA
commentators explain that political offenses such as "aggression" has not been
firmly described and may be too general for international law. The current
definition is "utterly unsuitable for application by an international criminal court."
Other treaties dealing with Unlawful Use of Weapons and Crimes Against
Humanity are not included in the ILA draft. See 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72,
at 280-81.
75. See supra notes 1-39 and accompanying text.
.76. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 358-68.
77. Id. at 369-388.
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3) 7Unlawful
Use of Weapons/Unlawful Emplacement of weap8
ons,
79
4) Crimes Against Humanity,
5) Genocide, 0
6) Racial Discrimination and Apartheid,8
7) Slavery and Related Crimes,'
8) Torture,83
9) Unlawful Human Experimentation,'
10) Piracy,85
11) Aircraft Hijacking,86
12) Threat
and Use of Force Against Internationally Protected
87
Persons,

88

Taking of Civilian Hostages,
Drug Offenses,89
International Traffic in Obscene Publications,90
Destruction and/or Theft of National Treasures,91
Environmental Protection,9 z
Theft of Nuclear Material,93
Unlawful Use of the Mails,94
Interference with Submarine Cables,95
Falsification and Counterfeiting, 96 and
97
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.
The Bassiouni draft defines international crimes according to
past multilateral treaties, based on the assumption that the
international community has already substantially agreed upon the
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 389-96.
Id. at 397-400.
Id. at 401-02.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 403-04.
Id. at 405-12.
Id. at 413-17.
Id. at 418-21.
Id. at 422-23.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 424-26.

87. Id. at 27-428.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 429-32.
Id. at 433-38.
Id. at 439-42.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 442-45.

92. Id. at 446-51.
93. Id. at 452.
94. Id. at 453-61.
95.
96.

Id. at 462.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 463-64.

97. Id. at 465.

1996]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

definition of these crimes. 98 The substantive law in these drafts
codifies the language in the prior multilateral treaties. However,
Bassiouni goes further in some provisions "to fill some gaps" in the
textual language. 99 This draft also leaves open the option
to add
1°
past or future treaties to the international criminal code. '
B. The InternationalCriminal Tribunal

The International Criminal Tribunal (The Tribunal) consists 1of2
1
organs created by statute including: the Court;" the Procuracy; 0
the Secretariat; 3 and the Standing Committee of States-Parties.14 The Tribunal is proposed to be a permanent body with
the purpose of enforcing the international criminal code over StateParties. 5 The Tribunal would have universal jurisdiction to
investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and punish persons, legal entities,

98. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 74. The ILA draft also codifies international
multilateral treaties to define international criminal law. 1984 ILA Draft, supra
note 72, at 257.
99. Bassiouni does not explain why he provides extra language in some of the
treaties. However, his commentary does reflect the changes. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 1, at 74.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
102. This is the organ of the tribunal that investigates, prosecutes, and oversees
the application of the decisions of the court. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 218. For
a more detailed discussion of the Procuracy, see infra notes 118-134 and
accompanying text.
103. The Secretariat is the clerical and administrative organ of the tribunal. Its
work consists of preparing budget requests for each organ of the tribunal and
making and publishing an annual report on the activities of each organ of the
tribunal. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 240.
104. The Standing Committee is a body consisting of one representative
appointed by each State-Party adopting the Statute. The Standing Committee
may, among other things:
1) offer to mediate disputes between States-Parties relating to the
functions of the tribunal;
2) encourage States to participate in the tribunal;
3) exclude from participation representatives of States-Parties when
States fail to provide the required financial support for the tribunal or
fail to carry out other obligations;
4) propose international instruments to enhance the functions of the
tribunal; and
5) grant a petition to mediate between the parties of the case, at which
time the Court proceeding shall be stayed until the mediation and
conciliation efforts conclude.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 241.
105. A State-Party is a country which has signed the treaty agreeing to the rules
of the tribunal.
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and states.'0 6 Upon a finding of guilt, the court will have the
power to do the following: deprive a person of liberty; fine a
persons or
person, organization or state; impose injunctions against
°7
legal entities; and order restitution and damages.'
1. The Judiciary.- According to Bassiouni's draft, the court
would consist of twelve judges of separate nationality sitting in
rotational panels of three." s The judges would also hear cases en
banc and individually as supervisors of sanctions."° The judges
cannot be of. the same nationality.1 They are elected in brackets
of four-year, six-year, and eight-year terms with four judges for
each term."' The judges would be elected through secret ballot
by the Standing Committee from the nominations submitted by the
State-Parties. 2 Persons qualified to be nominated must be
jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts of their State,
distinguished experts in the fields of international criminal law or
human rights." 3
Additionally, a judge may withdraw from a case because of a
conflict of interest.' A judge may be also be removed from the
court for incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of
the other judges." 5 No action taken by the tribunal may be
contested in any forum other than the court en banc.11 6 StateParties must agree to enforce final judgments7 of the court in
accordance with the provisions of this statute.'

106. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 222. The ILA only has jurisdiction to persons
not legal entities (corporations, associations) and states. 1984 ILA Draft, supra
note 72, at 259, 282.
107. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 225.
108. Id. at 236-37. The ILA draft provides that the Court shall consist of nine

members serving six years. The judges must be jurists of international repute and
represent different countries. A Contracting State (similar to a State-Party) may
nominate two candidates. The Contracting States will then elect the judges from
their nominations. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 259-260.
109. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 236-37.
110. Id. at 236.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 236.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 236-37.
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2. The Pretrial Process.- No criminal process can be
initiated unless a complaint is communicated to the Procuracy.n s
The Procuracy is the organ of the tribunal that investigates,
prosecutes, and oversees the application of the decisions of the
court. 9 If a complaint is made by a State-Party, it is obligated
to do anything and everything necessary to assist the tribunal in its
proceedings, including transmitting relevant1 documents, information, and materials relevant to the accused. 2
The Investigative Division of the Procuracy undertakes an
investigation to determine whether or not complaints are "manifestly unfounded. 12 1 Once the complaint is deemed "not manifestly
unfounded," the record will be transferred to the Prosecutorial
Division of the Procuracy, and the accused and the State of the
accused will be immediately informed."
The prosecutor's
communication shall be made in any of the official languages of the
accused's country.z3
In cases of urgency, the competent authorities of the Tribunal
may request the accused's State to provisionally arrest the person
sought for extradition in order to prevent escape. 24 This provisional arrest is only valid for thirty days while the prosecutor
1 5
prepares the formal documents for the individual's extradition.
The prosecutor must also request orders from the appropriate
chamber of the court for arrest warrants, subpoenas, injunctions,
search warrants, and warrants for the surrender of the accused."2
All orders should be executed pursuant to the relevant laws of the
118. Id. at 226. The ILA states that only individuals or groups of a Contracting
State may present a complaint. The alleged offender must be a citizen of a

Contracting State. 1983 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 427.
119.. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 239. The ILA created an International
Commission of Criminal Inquiry (Commission) consisting of seven members who
are "jurists of repute." 1983 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 426.
120. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 87.
121. The Procuracy cannot deem a complaint by a State-Party or Organ of the
U.N. "manifestly unfounded." Other states and intergovernmental organizations
can appeal a "manifestly unfounded" determination to the court. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 226.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The formal documents necessary to inform the State of the investigation
of the accused must include: the authority and jurisdiction of the Tribunal; the
basis and legal reasons; the information concerning the individual; the facts
underlying the request; and some evidence concerning the chargei This documentation also applies to a request for evidence. Id. at 183.
126. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 183.
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State in which they are executed. 127 The prosecutor then presents

the case to the court for a preliminary hearing.128 The accused is
present with counsel at this preliminary hearing. 29
At the preliminary hearing, the court will determine whether
the case is reasonably founded in law and fact, and whether there
were any prior proceedings before this tribunal or elsewhere
barring the process according to the principles of double jeopardy
and fundamental notions of fairness.13 The court also determines
whether any conditions exist that would render the adjudication
unreliable or unfair.3

The draft also states that due regard will be given to the
principle of fairness and the concept of a "speedy trial" when
scheduling the proceedings. 32 A statute of limitations will also
prohibit prosecution or punishment for international criminal code
crimes, with the exception of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.133 Other drafts, such as the ILA's drafts provide more
procedure during the preliminary hearings."

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. If the accused, by reason of personal conditions, is unable to assume his
own defense or to provide his own defense, counsel will be appointed ex officio.
Id. at 246. See also infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. This is the draft's
first provision for counsel for the accused.
130. The commentary explains that this clause "provides an opportunity for
early consideration of whether misconduct in preparation of the case may have
impugned the Tribunal's integrity in such a way to impair the credibility or
acceptability of its determinations." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 230.
131. The commentary states that this clause is intended to deal with the
possibility that non-cooperation of States, particularly non-Parties, may render
evidence (either incriminating or exculpatory) unavailable, so that a fair trial
would be impossible. Early detection of these problems would tend to avoid
double jeopardy questions regarding aborted proceedings. Id. at 230.
132. Id. at 229.
133. The Statute of Limitations bars prosecution or punishment by a period of
limitations of lesser duration than the maximum penalty ascribed to the crime in
question. Id. at 111.
134. The ILA provides that the Commission will investigate the complaint and
can request national authorities to assist in the performance of its functions. The
Commission may call witnesses, request evidence and call experts. The accused
shall have the right to be assisted by counsel, submit evidence, cross examine
witnesses and inspect any documents introduced in the inquiry. Where the
Commission has a strong suspicion and belief, on reasonable and probable
grounds, that the person committed the offense covered under the international
criminal code, it may request the Contracting State to confer jurisdiction and take
the person into custody. Upon a majority vote by the Commission, they may
recommend an indictment. 1983 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 429-430.
The indictment shall contain the statement of facts which constitute the
offense and specific reference to the legal provisions under which the accused is
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3. The Trial Process.- According to the draft proposal,
cases shall be heard by a three judge panel without a jury.135
Hearings on the ultimate merits of the case will be conducted in
public and the deliberations will be held in camera. 13 6 The court
will give equal weight to evidence and arguments presented in
accordance with the principle of "equality of arms" of the party.137 Further, during the course of the proceedings, the accused
would be entitled to certain basic rights, such as the presumption
of innocence, the right to a speedy trial, the right to question the
legality of obtained evidence, the right to remain silent, the right to
to question whether charges are
assistance of counsel, and the right
13 8
based upon reasonable grounds.
This draft also recognizes principles of exoneration, justification, and excusability. This would allow the accused to be released
from liability for his actions. 13 These defenses include selfdefense, necessity, coercion, obedience to superior orders, refusal
to obey a superior order which constitutes a crime, mistake of law
or fact, double jeopardy, insanity, intoxication or drugged condition, and renunciation.' 4°
141
Lay or expert witnesses may be called by both parties.
The witnesses can only testify on their voluntary consent. Howev-

charged. The court is not bound to apply the legal provisions referred to in the
indictment, but will give reasonable notice to the parties to enable them to prepare
accordingly. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 289.
135. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 231.
136. Id. The ILA provides for hearings to be public unless private sessions are
necessary in the international public interest. For example, sessions held in

camera may become necessary in order to prevent methods of illicit traffic in
dangerous drugs or methods of currency counterfeiting from being disclosed to the
public. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 288.
137. "Equality of arms" means the accused will have substantial parity in the

proceedings. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 151-81 and accompanying text.
139. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 109-112.
140. Bassiouni's commentary explains:
While the civil law system would view the conditions of exoneration

listed in this Article as a questionable combination of principles of
responsibility and legal defenses, it was felt that a single Article

containing all conditions which ultimately result in exonerations from
responsibility, irrespective of their doctrinal of dogmatic basis should be

placed together, as it gives these aspects a sense of cohesion and practical
use by an international tribunal.
Id. at 109-112.
141.

Id. at 198.
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of residence
er, even if witnesses volunteer to testify, their State
142
may deny the transfer to testify before the ICC.
The decisions of the Court are to be announced publicly and
be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 43 Upon a determination of guilt, a separate hearing will be
held regarding the sanctions to be imposed.1" This hearing will
allow for evidence of mitigation and aggravation.145 The accused
and the Procuracy may appeal questions of law to the court en
banc.'" Decisions of the court en banc and unappealed determinations will be deemed final unless:
(1) Evidence unknown at the time of the Determination has
been discovered which would have had a material effect on the
outcome of the said Determination or order; or
(2) The Court or Chamber was flagrantly misled as to the
nature of matters affecting the outcome; or
(3) On the face of the record the facts alleged have not been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; or
(4) The facts proved do not constituted a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or
(5) Other grounds the Court may provide by its Rules.'47

The punishment to be imposed upon an individual found guilty
is determined by Sanction Supervising Judges of the ICC.'" The
to impose the sentence in
court may also call upon any State-Party
149
laws.
state's
the
with
accordance
4. Procedural Rights of the Accused.- The rights of the
accused provided for in the draft are the fundamental human rights
enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."5 These
rights include the presumption of innocence, "equality of arms,"

142. Denial of transfer may be based upon the possible detrimental effect on
the course or conduct of the legal proceedings or for reasons of the safety, welfare
and well-being of the witness. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 233.
144.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 233.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 234. The ILA states that decisions are final and not appealable.
1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 266.
147.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 234.

148. Id. at 234-5.
149. Id. at 235.
150. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A
(III); InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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speedy, trial, evidentiary protections, the right to remain silent,
assistance of counsel, prohibition of arrest and detention unless
based on reasonable grounds, and protection of the rights and
interests of the victim.'5 '
The following provide descriptions and illustrations of
Bassiouni's draft Article XXIX, "Standards for Rules and Procedures," of the protected rights for the accused under the international criminal code.
The presumption of innocence is a "fundamental principle of
justice."' 52 One protection under this principle is that no one can
be convicted or declared guilty unless he has been tried in a fair
trial.'53 A second protection is that no criminal punishment or
any equivalent sanction may be imposed upon the accused unless
he has been proven guilty according to the law."5 A third
protection is that no person shall be required to prove his innocence.155 Finally, the decision must be in favor of the accused in
cases of doubt. 56
"Equality of arms" is a procedural protection given to the
accused to ensure substantial parity in proceedings and procedures. 57 This includes giving the accused effective ways to
challenge evidence58produced by the prosecution and the right to
present a defense.'
Criminal proceedings shall be speedily conducted to protect
the accused without interfering with the defendant's right to
adequately prepare for trial. 9 This protection provides for time
limits for each stage of the proceedings and can only be extended
by order of the court. 6° Additionally, complex cases involving
multiple defendants can be severed in the interests of time and
fairness.1 6' Furthermore, administrative and disciplinary measures
151. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 245-48. The ILA draft differs in that the
procedural rights are limited to the presumption of innocence, the right to be
present in all proceedings, the right to have the proceedings translated into his
own language, the right to be heard and cross-examine witnesses, the right to
remain silent, and the right not to take an oath. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72,
at 265.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156.
157.
158.

1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 265.
Id.
Id.

159.

Id.

160.
161.

Id.
1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 265.
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will be taken against officials of the tribunal who negligently violate
these rules.16
Evidentiary protections ensure that all procedures and methods
for securing evidence, which interfere with internationally guaranteed human rights, must be in accordance with the standards set
forth by the ICC and the international criminal code. 63 Likewise,
evidence will not be admissible in court if it was obtained directly
or indirectly by illegal means.1" If the evidence does not constitute a serious violation, it will be admissible upon the discretion of
the judge. 65 Finally, the admissibility of evidence must also take
into account the "integrity of the judicial system, the rights of the
defense, the interests of the victim, and the interests of the world
community."'"
The right to remain silent protects a person who is accused of
a criminal violation. The accused must be informed of this
right.167 However, the Bassiouni draft does not explain when the
accused would be informed of this right. There is also no mention
of whether that silence could be used against the accused."6
The assistance of counsel is another protection provided to the
accused at all stages of the proceedings, after the preliminary
hearing. Anyone suspected of a criminal violation has the right to
defend himself and to choose competent legal assistance. 6 9
Counsel will be appointed if the accused is unable to assume a
defense or provide for such a defense through counsel.17 The
accused or counsel for the accused should be provided with all
incriminating and exculpatory evidence available to the prosecution
as soon as possible. 171 The counsel or the accused must be given
reasonable time to prepare a defense.1 72 Furthermore, if the
accused is detained, counsel will have the right to access to the

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Illegal means of obtaining evidence involves a serious violation of
internationally protected human rights or a violation of this convention and rules
of this tribunal. Id. at 246.
165. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 245-46.
166. Id. at 246.
167. Id.
168. Id.

169. Id.
170. 1984 ILA Draft, supra note 72, at 246.
171. The counsel should have such information no later than the conclusion of
the investigation or before adjudication. Id.; BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 246.
172. Id.

1996]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

accused and communicate in private, subject only to reasonable
security measures decided by a judge of the court. '
The right against arbitrary arrest and detention protects the
accused from being deprived of his or her liberty until there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed an
international crime.'

Additionally, a court must make the

determination of whether a person can be deprived of his or her
liberty.175 Any arrest and detention must be in conformity with
the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners and the
Principles on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention of the
United Nations. 76 Alternative measures to detention, such as
Prior detention will
bail, should be used whenever possible.'77
be credited toward the fulfillment of the sanctions imposed by the
Court. 178

The rights and interests of victims include giving the victim the
opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings and the right
to protect his civil interests.179 Another right is access to prior
records of a similar prosecution.180 However, as long as the
records of any prior proceeding are taken into account, including
the accused, the case
any prior measures in respect to the guilt of
8
'
jeopardy.'
double
under
barred
be
not
will
This outline of Bassiouni's draft intends to provide a framework to compare a proposed court with other existing criminal
justice systems. The next part of this article surveys the Iranian
criminal justice system and its ideology. Afterward, Bassiouni's

draft will be compared with the Iranian and American systems in
order to predict Iranian and American reasons for supporting or
opposing an ICC.
IV. A Survey of the Iranian Criminal Justice System
This part explains the judicial structure and criminal procedures provided for the accused in Iran. The reason this country is
discussed and eventually compared with Bassiouni's draft is due to
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.

176.

See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 247. Bassiouni's commentary provides a

list of various treaties by which these standards will be determined.
177. Other measures include house arrest and work release. Id. at 247.
178. Id. at 246-47.

179.
180.
181.

Id. at 246-48.
Id.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 246-48.
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its radical adoption of Islamic Law. Moreover, studying the Islamic
system of Iran may also reflect similar value systems of the fortytwo other Muslim countries of the world.1s2
A. Relevant History of Iran
To understand the Iranian system, one must first understand
the history and ideology underlying its criminal justice system. The
Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was the end of a long struggle
between the Islamic revivalist movement and the secular Western
ideas that were spreading throughout the region."s The Ayatollah Yahya Noori, a Muslim scholar in Iran, described the revolution
as "not a new phenomenon but a continuation of the age-long
struggle between "the forces of justice and injustice, piety and
impiety, truth and falsehood, Islam and-its enemies.""
The victory of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic
militants over the Pahlavi monarchy. resulted in a dramatic
upheaval of the governing infrastructure of Iran. l"5 The Constitution of 1906-07, which ensured that Iranian laws were to be largely
imported from European countries, was abandoned."l 6 Also
abandoned, was the Iranian Penal Code, which was first drafted by
a French jurist and was heavily based upon French civil law."s
The Iranian Revolution replaced this secular, Western-styled
government with an Islamic government which would rely on
Traditional Islamic Law (Sharia)1 " as the primary source of law.
This replacement of secular law for Islamic law was especially
prevalent in criminal justice cases.

182. For example, in the Middle East alone, Islamic Law is incorporated in the
constitutions, civil codes, or national laws of countries such as: Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and
Oman. S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 1 (1985).

183. See generally, Nader Entessar, Criminal Law and the Legal System in
Revolutionary Iran, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 91 (1988). Other sources explain
that the revolution had more to do with the corruption of the monarchy rather
than the mass desire for a return to Islam. This opinion is based on the fact that
many secular lawyers and judges were in support of the revolution. Michael M.
J. Fischer, Legal Postulates in Flux: Justice, Wit, and Hierarchy in Iran, in LAW
AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, at 115-116 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
184. AYATOLLAH YAHYA NOORI & SAYED HASSAN AMIN, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN
AND PAKISTAN 63 (1987).

185.

AMIN, supra note 182, at 57; Fischer, supra note 183, at 117; Entessar,

supra note 183, at 93.

186. Id.
187.

Id.

188. Id.
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Sharia is derived from the Koran, the holy book of Muslims.189 However, because the Koran states relatively few defined
legal rules,"9 three other sources have contributed to Islamic
Law. The following sources are listed in order of importance when
determining Islamic Law. Statements and deeds of the Prophet
Mohammed and the Imams' 9' (Hadith) is the second main source
of Islamic Law. The constitution created after the Iranian
revolution states that in the absence of the Imam, all political and
legal power emanates from a "Just Jurist."
The Jurist was
Khomeini.
Another source of Islamic law is "ijma," which refers to the
consensus of Islamic legal scholars when interpreting the sources of
law previously described."9 The last source of 'law is the "aql,"
which is the sitting judge's analogic reasoning when deciding a
case. 93 The interpretation of Sharia law could only be done by
an Islamic cleric or persons with traditional Islamic educations.'94
Therefore, all judges with Western training were removed from
their positions. 95
Critics of this system cite the inherent arbitrariness of this law
which has resulted in the elimination of due process, repression and
intimidation of citizens.'
However, documents such as judicial
opinions or other reports relating to the present-day interpretation
and implementation of Sharia law in Iran are not readily available,
particularly in the United States. 97 As a result, it will not be
feasible to dispute or affirm such criticisms in this paper. Therefore, the following discussion on the judicial structure, trial process,
and procedural safeguards of an ICC will be based upon the laws
Iran theoretically claims to follow. Whether the Iranian judiciary

189. Fischer, supra note 183, at 117.
190. Approximately 600 lines would be defined as legal rules in the Koran.
191. Imams are considered the rightful successors to the Prophet in the Shi'a
branch of Islam. Shi'ism is the dominant belief system in Iran. Entessar, supra
note 183, at 92.
192. Entessar, supra note 183, at 94; Fischer, supra note 183, at 121.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. AMIN, supra note 182, at 62-63; Entessar, supra note 183, at 92. The
Western-influenced Bar was also dismantled in 1981-1982 when regarded as a
roadblock to implementing Islamic law. ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITIONS AND POLITICs 34-35 (1991).
196. MAYER, supra note 195, at 35; Entessar, supra note 183, at 101.
197. AMIN, supra note 182, at 64. Research by the author of this paper verifies
this conclusion.
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actually follows and implements these laws cannot be addressed
because of resource limitations.
B. Defining Criminal Law
The criminal code of Iran was first ratified in 1936 and was
replaced in 1982 and 1983 after the revolution. 198 The criminal

procedure code of 1932 was also replaced immediately after the
revolution in 1979.19 The revolution repealed these codes and all
rules and procedures related to investigation and punishment of
crimes.'
The previous codes were modeled after the French
civil code and were, therefore, considered a manifestation of
western cultural imperialism.2 1
Replacing the secular codes, Khomeini often preached that
God was the sole legislator in Iran, leaving no room for human
legislative activity' ° Ironically, and in spite of that rhetoric,
Iranian law has continued to be made, just as it was under the
Pahlavi monarchy, in the form of statutes and codes enacted by the
Iranian Parliament (Majlis).2 °3 The legislature still creates law
and the judiciary applies such law in light of the power that
Khomeini had over the regime.'
Professor Ann E. Mayer
describes the continued adherence to legislative law as the
following:
[T]here are Muslims who are aware of the incongruity of raising
man-made laws to the stature of primary sources of law in legal
systems purportedly designed to reinstate Islamic law. However, the idea that it is governmental enactments that determine
what enjoys the status of "law" has become so well entrenched
in modern legal systems that the arguments of those who insist
that Islamization programs should preserve the traditional
Shari'ah methodology have fallen on deaf ears.205
Regardless of this incongruity, the legislature's purpose is still to
codify the Sharia and the judiciary's purpose is to apply this law.
Furthermore, judges are ordered to base their decisions on codified

AMIN, supra note 182, at 113.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ann Mayer, The Shari'ah: A Methodology of a Body of Substantive
Rules?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, at 181 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990).
198.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191.
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laws and 6 if they cannot do so, they must use reputable Islamic
20

sources.

The Iranian Penal Code has divided crimes into four categories
based upon the punishment for each offense called hudud, qisa,
ta'zir and diyat.207
Hudud crimes are acts prohibited by
God.2 ° These include theft, robbery, adultery, apostasy, drinking
Since the
alcoholic beverages, and rebellion against Islam.'
Koran explicitly provides the form of punishment to be meted out
for each crime, the judge has no discretion regarding punishment.
Forms of the death penalty include stoning for adultery, and
210
crucifixion and death by sword for homicide during robbery.
The most well known punishment is amputation of the arm or hand
for theft. n
Qisa crimes include murder, manslaughter, battery, mutilation
to person, and damage to property.212 These crimes .are the
subject of private claims, and retaliation is allowed by the victim or
the victims family.213 There is no prosecution or execution, ex
officio, only a guarantee of the right of personal vengeance coupled
with safeguards against exceeding legal limits. 214 However, settlements, other than physical acts of vengeance, are possible. These
settlements include blood-money, amicable settlements, and
forgiveness of the perpetrator.2 5
Ta'zir offenses are those to which no specific penalties are
mentioned in the Koran or other sources of law. 216 Common
ta'zir offenses include immodest clothing, immoral behavior, and
public drunkenness. 21 7 Since these offenses are not explicit in

206.
207.

Entessar, supra note 183, at 95.
Id. at 96.

208.

Id. at 96-97; MATrHEw LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND

PROCEDURE 45-49 (1988);
LAW 175, 178-181 (1982).

JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC,

209. Id.
210. Entessar, supra note 183, at 97; LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 46-47;
SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 178-181.
211. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 45.
212. Entessar, supra note 183, at 97; see also LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 49;
SCHACHT,

note 208, at 187.

213. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 50.
214. Id.
215. Entessar, supra note 183, at 98. On numerous occasions, Khomeini
chastised clerics for their zealous advocacy in encouraging retribution and
vendettas. Id. at 97.
216. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 52-53; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 187;

Entessar, supra note 183, at 98.
217. Id.
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Islamic law, the punishment is left to the discretion of the judge as
to the range of punishments set out in the penal code.21 8 These

punishments range from admonition to public flogging.219
Diyat is not a crime, but a separate punishment referring to a
form of compensation, or blood-money, which is to be paid to the
victim or the victim's family as reparation for an injury or murder.220 This category is for those who choose to forgo their right
of retribution under the qisa punishment.221
C. Islamic Criminal Process and Procedure
The following is a discussion of the trial process, procedure,
and structure of the Iranian criminal system. The first section will
discuss the definition and role of the judiciary. The second and
third sections will discuss the pretrial and trial processes for the
criminally accused in Iran. The final section will list and explain the
specific procedural protections provided for an individual who is
accused of a crime.
1. The Judiciary.- The new constitution of 1979 delegates
22
the administration of justice in Iran to the Ministry of Justice.
The courts within the Ministry of Justice include the Supreme
Judicial Counsel, Court of Cassation, Public Courts, and Special
Criminal Courts. The following discussion will describe the
purpose of each of these courts.
a. Supreme Judicial Counsel The five members of this
counsel have two purposes. As the supreme body of judicial
authority, the counsel has wide latitude in interpreting the Sharia
and ultimate authority over all judges in Iran.2 Specifically, the
court determines the laws under which the lower courts operate.224 They also hear appeals from defendants sentenced to the
death penalty.22 Counsel members must be learned scholars of
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 50; SCHACHT,

220.
Entessar, supra note 183, at 98.
221.

supra note 208, at 181;

Id.

222. The concept of a constitutional government is clearly a Western notion.
Nevertheless, the Islamic revolutionaries acquiesced to political pressure and
created a new constitution, although subordinate to the limits of Islamic Law.
Mayer, supra note 201, at 191.

223. Entessar, supra note 183, at 98.
224. Id. at 99.
225. Id.
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Islamic law who are called "mujtahid"
and they must be
confirmed by the "just jurist.' '22 They serve a five year renewable term.2' Three members are elected by sitting judges of
various courts. 229 Two members, including the Chief Justice, are
appointed by the "Just Jurist."'
b. The Courtof Cassation (The Supreme Court) Before
the revolution, the court of Cassation functioned as the highest
appeals court in the country. 31 However, after the revolution, all
intermediate courts of appeals were abolished except this court. 32
This court still hears criminal appeal cases, with the exception of
death penalty appeals, which are heard by the Supreme Judicial
Counsel.33 The main function of this court is to supervise the
proper application of laws by the lower courts.2' The president
of the Supreme Court must be a Mujtahid." 5
c. Public Courts After the revolution, public courts
were established to deal with both civil and criminal cases. In the
criminal area, the public courts are divided into two subcategories,
First and Second Class criminal courts.1 6 The jurisdiction of First
Class criminal courts covers major criminal cases where convictions
normally carry a death sentence, long term imprisonment, and
heavy fines.37 Decisions handed down in this court can theoretically be appealed to the Court of Cassation if the penalty involves
over two months imprisonment.'
However', it is extremely
difficult to take an appeal. 9 Death penalty .decisions are appealed to the Supreme Judicial Counsel.' Second Class criminal

226.

Id. at 98-99.

227.
228.

Id.
Entessar, supra note 183, at 99.

229. Id
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. AMIN, supra note 182, at 134.
233. Id.; Entessar, supra note 183, at 99.
234. Entessar, supra note 183, at 99.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.;

AMIN,

supra note 182, at 131.

239. Entessar, supra note 183, at 99. Because the judges decided "God's Will"
based on sources of law such as the Koran, appeals were considered unnecessary.
While exceptions are made in criminal cases, there is not an appeals process in
civil cases. Id.
240. Id.
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courts have jurisdiction over minor crimes such as vagrancy,
beggary, and failure to obey rules of the police or municipal
officials.241 Since the sentences handed down are light, these
decisions are final and cannot be appealed.242
d.

Special CriminalCourts Shortly after the revolution,

a number of ad hoc courts were established to try and punish
"offenders of the Islamic mores" and "enemies of the Islamic
Republic. '243 One example of this type of court is the Revolutionary Court. This court conducted summary trials of officers and
government officials of the former Pahlavi regime.2
These
courts have survived after the initial stages of the revolution and
have expanded their jurisdiction to hear all criminal cases including
sexual and religious offenses. 245 This court consists of a three
judge panel: a religious judge, appointed by the "just jurist"; a civil
judge, nominated by the Ministry of Justice and approved by the
court's religious judge; and an individual "trusted by the people"
and approved by the religious judge. In practice, the court has
been dominated by the religious judge.2 6 There is no right to
appeal from this court.247
2.

The PretrialProcess.-

The following section on pre-trial

process describes the treatment one would receive under Islamic
Law. In 1979, the Iranian code of criminal procedure claimed to
codify Sharia law.2' Because of the inaccessibility of the Iranian
code, this discussion will describe Sharia law.
There are two ways to initiate a lawsuit in Iran. First, the
plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit if he or she alleges a qisa crime was
perpetrated against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's family.24 9
Second, the state has exclusive right to commence criminal action
in the case of Hudud and Ta'zir offenses.25 In the first instance,

241. Id
242. Id.
243. Entessar, supra note 183, at 99-100.
244. During the early days of the Revolutionary Court, over 1000 executions
occurred within an eleven-week span. These sentences were carried out less than
twenty-four hours after the trial. Fischer, supra note 183, at 117.
245. AMIN, supra note 182, at 131.
246. Entessar, supra note 183, at 100.
247. Id. at 101.
248. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
249. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 68; ScHAHT,supra note 208, at 189-90.
250. Id.
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the plaintiff presents the complaint to the appropriate judge.251
The judge questions the accused concerning the claim.252 If the
accused admits guilt, the lawsuit is decided. If the accused denies
the claim, the judge asks the plaintiff to produce evidence for the
trial.253 If the plaintiff declares that he or she has evidence such
as witnesses, the judge may demand a surety for the defendant for
three days, or the plaintiff may watch over the defendant, wherever
he goes, without entering his house.'
For all other crimes, the state initiates the action. If there is
reason to believe the accused committed a crime, pretrial investiga-

tions begin.255 Pretrial detention is largely thought of as unnecessary given the collective obligations of the family and the easy
recognition and distrust of strangers, making flight difficult or
impossible for the accused. 56 Pretrial interrogation is conducted
by the minister of complaints, an arm of the judiciary, and the
prosecutor. The Koran explicitly prohibits the use of beatings,
torture, or inhumane treatment to extract a confession."5 7 Confessions must be freely, voluntarily, and truthfully given." The
accused is to be treated humanely and is encouraged to deny his
guilt.259 In theory, the majority of jurists would exclude from
evidence confessions obtained by force or deceit.26
During the investigatory stage, the individual, his home, and
his possessions may be searched only by investigative officials, if
required for social order and safety. 61 The minister of complaints must authorize the warrant if there is sufficient evidence
that the accused committed the crime.262 This evidence may be
based upon testimony of a trustworthy witness or pressing circumstantial evidence.26

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
official
coming

SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 190, 197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LIPPMAN,

supra note 208, at 62.

Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
supra note 208, at 65-6.
Id. at 66.
Id. One example of pressing circumstantial evidence occurs when an
knows that there is a smell of alcohol and noise of intoxicated persons
from a person's home. Id.
LIPPMAN,
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In reality, the pretrial process in Iran was quite different in the
early stages after the revolution. Full investigations, as just
described, were thought of as a luxury.2" As a result, trials and
executions were done swiftly to prevent counter-revolutions.2
3. The Trial Process.- The litigants and the judge are the
focal points in the courtroom.2' The right to an attorney during
the pretrial and trial stages varies depending on the offense.
Counsel is not permitted for Hudud offenses, with the exception of
theft and defamation.267 Counsel is likely permitted in the trial
of Qisa and Ta'zir offenses.26 However, judges encourage direct
litigant input even when lawyers are present.269
Evidence is limited to three types: eyewitness testimony,
confessions, and religious oaths.27
This limit is based on the
assumption that such evidence possesses a high degree of reliability.
One qualification is that an eyewitness must be male, although in
isolated instances two women may substitute for one man.2 7'
Four witnesses are required to establish the offenses of adultery
and sodomy, while two witnesses are required for other offenses.2'
Another primary requisite to be a witness is that the
witness should be a Muslim of good character.273 The opposing.
party may present evidence to prove the witness does not have
good character and, therefore, cannot testify.274 Once a witness

264.
265.
266.

See Fischer, supra note 183, at 117-18.
Id. at 118.
Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Law and Islam in the Middle East: An Introduction,

in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, at 4 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
267. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 65.

268. Id.
269. Dwyer, supra note 266, at 5
270. See LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 69-73.
271. These instances include matters to which women have special knowledge
such as birth and virginity. Other areas have included property and employment
matters. Otherwise, women are disqualified to testify as witnesses because they
are viewed as having "weakness of understanding, want of memory and incapacity
in governing." LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 69; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 193.
272. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 69.
273. A man of good character is one who is sane, the age of legal responsibility,
free, neither dumb, mute or blind, and never punished for a serious offense or
engaged in sinful behavior. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 69; SCHACHT, supra note
208, at 193.
274. For example, if the witness will benefit from the outcome of the
proceedings or if he is a personal enemy of the accused or near relative of one of
the parties, he will be disqualified. SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 193-94.
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is qualified, he can only testify to events he directly observed.
Hearsay is inadmissible.27
Confession is the second source of evidence used in trials. A
confession must be in open court and must be repeated as many
times as the number of witnesses required to prove guilt.27 6 As
with pretrial interrogations, the admission must be free and
voluntary.277 Interestingly, the requirement of "truthfulness" in
confessions is not stated, although it is required during pretrial
confessions.2 8 -The confession must also describe the criminal act
in detail and must be corroborated by other evidence. 79
Oaths are the last sources of evidence admissible at trial. The
accused is asked to take an oath of innocence if a- plaintiff cannot
produce any other evidence that the accused committed the
crime.' If the accused takes the oath, the caseis dismissed. 2 l
The judge is the fact-finder and decision-maker in the
courtroom. No jury system exists in Islamic law.'
The judge
has a secretary who commits the judgment into writing.2
Decisions are final and, under strict Islamic law, there is no
appeal.2m However, when a judge is replaced, his successor takes
over the records and the prison.' This successor has the power
to instruct two fiduciaries to review all records to determine
whether prisoners were justly imprisoned.'
If the judge determines that any individual was improperly imprisoned, he can
release that individual.'
In reality, the trial process in Iran was not public and executions were swift, even though the government claimed to follow the
Islamic rules of criminal procedure. Iranian scholar Michael M.J.
Fisher described the initial realities of the revolution:

275.
276.

LIPPMAN,

supra note 208, at 70.

Id.

277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280.
281.

SCHACHT, supra note 208, at'190.
Id.

282. Id.
283. Id at 188-89.
284. Id. at 189.
285. SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 189.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 189, 195-196. LIPPMAN, supra note 208,at 68. Islamic judges, after
the revolution, likely used this principal to release prisoners. AMIN, supra note
182, at 63.
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Ayatollah Khomaini directed the Minister of Justice that all
decisions should be swift and final and that there should be no
appeal processes in either civil or criminal cases. He reiterated
that criminal had no right to lawyers. In part, he was reacting
to the interested slowness of the Pahlavi regime's administration
of justice, which allowed graft. In part, full investigations were
felt to be a luxury, and executions had to be done swiftly in
order to protect against a counterrevolution.2 m

However, an outcry arose from the middle class population,
including the clergy who fought against the brutality of the
monarchy's

police.2"

Their

complaints

against Khomeini's

summary executions caused him to halt the trials until a code of
criminal procedure was established.2 ° The code still allowed
Khomeini to appoint prosecutors, obligate sentences to be carried
out within twenty-four hours of the trial, and deny criminals the
right to an attorney.291 The code did allow trials to become
slightly more public and allowed the accused to speak in his own
defense. 292
The fundamental
4. Procedural Rights of the Accused.principles from the Koran regarding the rights of individuals
include, but are not limited to, the following: 293 all free men are
equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection; 294 all
decisions must conform to the Sharia; laws cannot be applied

288. Fischer, supra note 183, at 118.
289. Id. at 118.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 118-19. Khomeini also limited the persons who would qualify for
executions. Included were those who killed people, issued the order to kill, or
commit torture resulting in death. Most of these persons were officials of the
Executions also continued for sexual deviance, pornography,
monarchy.
prostitution, political dissent (in the case of the Kurds), contact with Israel (in the
case of prominent Jews), and religious beliefs (in the case of the Bahais). Fischer,
supra note 183, at 118-19.
293. These interests are: the guarantee of an individual's right to freedom of
religion; thought; expression; the right to have children and self preservation. Id.
at 64.
294. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 60. As for non-muslims, they are not subject
to Hudud punishments for drinking, fornication, or defamation. They also cannot
testify against muslims. Women, as well, have an inferior status and are treated
less harshly for apostasy and monetary damages. Certain exceptions also exist for
slaves. Id.
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retroactively; 295 and the accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.296 Based upon these principles, the accused is to
be free from pretrial detention, is free from warrantless search and
seizures, is permitted to present evidence in court, has the right to
remain silent during interrogation, and has the right to retain an
297
attorney.
a. PretrialDetention Pretrial detention is not used in
Islamic law. This prohibition derives from the idea that the mere
accusation of guilt is not sufficient to justify detention since the
accused is presumed innocent. 298 Some modern-day commentators in Muslim regions advocate the use of pretrial detention in
some circumstances. 299 However, it is not clear whether Iran
today supports these opinions.
b. WarrantlessSearch and Seizures Warrantless search
and seizures are prohibited in Islamic law. An investigative official
can only search an individual, his home, and his possessions with a
warrant.3 " Evidence discovered in the course of an unauthorized
search will not support the issuance of a warrant and is inadmissible
at trial.3 1 Once the warrant is obtained, the extent of the search
appears to have no limits." 2
c. The Right to Present Evidence The right to present
evidence in court is a right provided for both the plaintiff, prosecutor, and the defendant. This evidence specifically includes the right
to prove a witness is not qualified to testify.303 However, the
right to present evidence to challenge the credibility of witnesses
does not appear to mean that the defendant has the right to cross3
examine the hostile witnesses. 01
d. The Right to Remain Silent The right to remain
silent during interrogation is a protection afforded to the accused.

295. According to Lippman, most jurists contend that a law benefitting the
accused may be applied retroactively. Id. at 61.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 62-69.
298. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 62.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 65-66.
301. Id. at 66.
302. Id.
303. LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 64; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 193.
304. Id.
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This right allows the individual to refuse to answer questions and
such silence may not be used as evidence of guilt.3 5 This protection appears only to be present during an interrogation, not at any
other pretrial or trial proceedings.3" Therefore, if the accused
remains silent at any other proceeding, besides interrogation, the
silence may be used against him.3°
e. The Right to Retain an Attorney The right to retain
an attorney is a right based upon the principle of self-preservation.
The accused has the right to receive assistance to protect his
interest."l

This assistance includes counsel.3°9 The accused and

his attorney must be informed of the charges and the supporting
evidence.310 Further, the accused must'be informed :of the eviThe
dence the prosecution has indicating his innocence."
accused may be present during all proceedings against him and has
the right to be informed of what occurred if he or his attorney fails
to attend.1 2
-In sum, this discussion on criminal practices and procedures in
Iran has only described the theoretical protections provided to the
defendant. In reality, scholars have criticized the Iranian government and the courts for its highly arbitrary conduct regarding all
criminal practice and procedure.3"3 Nevertheless, the theoretical
adoption of Islamic law in Iran will be used to compare with
Bassiouni's proposed draft of an international criminal court.
Comparing the criminal systems of Iran and the United States with
the proposed draft will clarify possible areas of support and dissent.
This result may shed light on why these countries may not support
adoption of Bassiouni's draft.
V.

Comparing Iran and the United States With Bassiouni's
International Criminal Tribunal Draft Proposal

The purpose of this section is to compare the draft of the
International Criminal Tribunal with two other systems, Iran,
discussed supra, and the familiar, generalized system of the United
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 63.

Id.
Id.
Id.; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 190.
LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 64; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 190.
LIPPMAN, supra note 208, at 65..
Id.
Id.
See Entessar, supra note 183, at 101; MAYER, supra note 195, at 34-49.
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States. Comparing the system of Iran and the United States with
the draft reveals several apparent conflicts that may cause these
countries to be adverse to adopting an International Criminal
Tribunal. The Islamic underpinnings of the Iranian government
and the complex procedural laws of the United States will certainly
provide a basis for disputing the ICC. As such, this discussion will
review the draft of the Tribunal with an eye toward the possible
areas of support and dispute from the United States and other
Muslim countries, exemplified by Iran. 14
A. The Judiciary

Bassiouni's international court draft provides that there will be
twelve judges of different nationalities sitting in rotational panels
of three." 5 The judges would be elected by a secret ballot cast
by Standing Committee of the state-parties.1 6 They would be
distinguished experts in the fields of international criminal law or
human rights and other jurists qualified to serve on the highest
courts of their state." 7 A judge may, be removed from a case for
conflict of interest or for incapacity to fulfill his functions. 318
There would be no jury system, thus, decisions would be made
solely by the judges.1 9
1.

Comparisonof the Draft with the IranianJudiciary-

The

Iranian judiciary is generally divided into four chambers consisting
of the Supreme Judicial Counsel, the Court of Cassation, the Public
Courts and the Special Courts.3" A similarity between the
Iranian and the proposed draft's systems is the use of the judge as
the sole fact-finder. The most obvious difference between the
ICC's judiciary and the Iranian judiciary is that the vast majority of
the judges in Iran must be learned Islamic law scholars and
confirmed by the "just jurist."32' 1 One of the most likely reasons
for having religious judges in Iran is because they are interpreting

314. This paper will not discuss differing definitions for substantive criminal law
in these countries. Assuming that the multilateral treaties will be sufficient to
define substantive criminal law, this paper instead explores the procedural
comparisons of the three systems.
315. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
319. Id.
320. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
321. Id.
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However, Bassiouni's draft of
Islamic law, not secular law.
substantive criminal will consists of numerous multilateral treaties,
which are not based on Sharia law. Instead, these treaties
represent a span of countries with value systems ranging from
Judeo-Christian to Marxist. Therefore, if the Iranians are to
support the multilateral treaties, they must accept that such treaties
are not solely based upon Islamic law. If they are not based upon
Islamic Law, it would not be necessary to have all judges be
learned scholars of Islamic Law. However, based on the early
revolutionary tones of Khomeini, Western judges trying the alleged
criminal actions of an Iranian would be perceived as returning to
western "imperialism. 22

2. Comparison of Draft with the United States Judiciary.When comparing the Bassiouni draft with the system in the
United States it should first be noted that the United States
Constitution does not preclude participation in an ICC.32 Professor Louis Henkin states that some element of fundamental fairness
would be required in an ICC. 4 Therefore, any comparison of
the draft and the United States counterpart will assume the United
States is not prohibited from participating. Instead, the issue will
be whether the procedural safeguards in a draft statute of the ICC
are sufficient to persuade the United States into participating.
The President of the United States, with Senatorial consent,
appoints individuals to serve on the Supreme Court. The only
constitutionally stated qualification to be a judge in the United
States is citizenship. The ICC draft states that a qualification to be
on the ICC is that a person must be qualified to serve on their
nation's highest court.3" Since the draft allows for such general
requirements, the result could be the appointment of an uneducated, unexperienced judge.
Another source of contention between the ICC judiciary and
the United States judiciary is the jury system. In the United States,
the deeply ingrained right to a jury trial is guaranteed by Article
III, as well as the Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments of

322.
323.

See generally Entessar, supra note 183, at 91.
See infra note 402 and accompanying text.

324.

Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).

325.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 236 et seg.
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the Constitution.32 6 Professor James J. Gobert described the
importance of the jury system in the United States:
The strength of the jury lies in the fact that it is not totally
circumscribed by legal rules; and that it has the practical power
to do what is right, and not just what is technically required by
law. While this power may on occasion have been abused, its
proper exercise presents the jury in its finest light. The
potential for abuse can and should be corrected by greater care
in the selection and instructions of juries, but such potential
may be an acceptable price for providing the jury the freedom
to do justice in the individual case.327
The fact that the ICC draft does not provide a jury system will
likely be a source of contention for the United States. It is clear
that the ICC will not have to abide by the standards provided in
the United States Constitution. However, a right that is a crucial
part of the United States criminal justice system, may be a right too
basic to forgo.
B.

The PretrialProcess

In Bassiouni's draft of the International Criminal Tribunal, the
criminal process is initiated by a complaint to the Procuracy.3 s
If the Investigative Division determines that the complaint is "not
manifestly unfounded," the record will be transferred to the
Prosecutorial Division.329 If a state-party or an organ of the U.N.
makes a complaint, it cannot be deemed "manifestly unfound330
ed.,
The prosecutor can request the accused's state to provisionally
arrest the individual until the prosecutor prepares the necessary
documents for extradition. 331 The prosecutor may also request
the court to issue arrest warrants, subpoenas, search warrants, and
warrants for the extradition.33 2
Afterwards, the prosecutor
presents the case to the court for a preliminary hearing.333 The
court will determine a number of issues such as: the reasonable-

326.

James J. Gobert, in THE OXFORD COMPANION

at 880 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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ness of the case in light of .the law and facts; double jeopardy
concerns; any violations of fundamental notions of fairness such as
misconduct in preparing the case; and whether conditions exist that
would render adjudication unreliable or unfair." The court will
also give due regard to the statute of limitations, fairness, and the
"speedy trial" principal.335
1. Comparison-ofDraft with IranianPretrialProcess.- In
Iran, under Sharia Law, there are two ways to initiate a lawsuit,
depending on the alleged offense. If a qisa crime, that is, a violent
crime against an individual,336 is the alleged offense, the victim or
family of the victim must present the complaint to the judge.337
One major difference between the draft and the Iranian system is
that violent crimes perpetrated against an individual are the
subjects of private claims in Iran.33 For example, such crimes
against individuals can be resolved by retaliation by the victim's
family.33? It seems highly unlikely that the ICC would sanction
retaliation for international crimes.
In Iran, if the crime alleged is a hudud' or tazir 3" crime,
the State initiates the action.42 If there is' reason to believe the
accused committed the crime, a pretrial investigation begins. 43
Pretrial detention ,is considered largely unnecessary because of
collective obligations of the family, easy recognition and distrust of
strangers, making flight difficult or impossible.3" The lack of
pretrial detention in Iran differs from the proposal in the draft for
an International Tribunal. If an international prosecutor requested
Iran to. hold a possible defendant, this would directly contradict
Iran's rule against pretrial detention.
Further, during the investigatory stage, the investigative
officials in Iran may search the individual, home, and possessions
with a warrant from the Minister of Complaints.34 The draft of
the International Criminal Tribunal will not conflict with these rules

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.

340. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
342.
343.

Id.

Id.
344. Id.
345. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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of search and seizure because the prosecutor will follow the laws of
the State in which the warrants are executed. However, unlike
Iran, the draft does not explicitly state that evidence will be
automatically excluded if obtained without a warrant."l The
preliminary hearing envisioned in the draft does not exist in Iran.
However, in Iran, there is a requirement that a warrant be obtained
before any search or seizure and based upon testimony of a witness
or pressing circumstantial evidence.347 Therefore, Iran may
consider the added procedure of a preliminary hearing as a
needless roadblock to the prosecution of criminals.
2.

Comparison of Draft with .United States Pretrial Process.Since the pretrial process in the United States is more
complex, this' article discusses the fundamental differences with
Bassiouni's draft. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, 'against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no. Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause .

..

."" There are two clauses within this

Amendment that likely conflict with the draft. The first is the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the
suspect can show that the search was unreasonable, the evidence
obtained as a result of the search will not be admissible at trial. 9
In Bassiouni's draft, once the Prosecutorial Division gets a warrant
from the ICC, it must execute all orders pursuant to the relevant
laws of the country.3" Therefore, the International Prosecutor
will conduct a search according to the law of the United States
which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.351 However,
if the search was later to be found unreasonable, there are no
explicit provisions in the draft to exclude such evidence.
The second clause contained in the Fourth Amendment is that
no warrant shall be issued without probable cause.352 Probable
cause generally means that officials must have trustworthy evidence
that would make a reasonable person think it more likely than not
that the proposed arrest or search is justified.353 This applies to

346.
347.
348.

See supra note 164-66 and accompanying text.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

349. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)..
350. See supra note 164-66 and accompanying text.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See supra note 347.
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warrantless arrests and searches as well.3" The draft proposal
states that any provisional or pretrial arrest or detention shall only
take place when the court determines that there are reasonable
grounds to believe the accused committed the crime.355 If this
standard is less than the standard of probable cause, the result may
be the arrest or detention of an American who would not otherwise
have been arrested or detained in the United States. In regards to
search warrants, there is no standard of reasonableness required.
The warrant is in the complete discretion of the judge.356 Furthermore, evidence obtained without a warrant is not necessarily
excluded at trial. 7
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no person "shall be compelled

. . .

to be a witness

'
against himself."358
This privilege is available outside of court
proceedings and other formal proceedings, and serves to protect
persons during custodial interrogations from being compelled to
incriminate themselves. Thus, when "an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived by the authorities in any significant
way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against selfincrimination is jeopardized. 3 59 The procedural safeguards
adopted required the police to inform an individual before
questioning that he has the right to remain silent; anything he says
can be used against him in court; he has the right to the presence
of an attorney; and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed.3 °
In Bassiouni's draft, the Prosecutor can obtain an arrest
warrant and a warrant for the surrender of the accused.361 The
Prosecutor or any other official is not prohibited from questioning
the suspect during this time. The draft does not require officials to
notify the accused of any protections against self-incrimination.
Furthermore, the first mention of the right to counsel in the draft
is at the preliminary hearing, a proceeding that occurs after the
arrest and extradition of the accused.362 Therefore, under the
draft proposal an individual can be taken into custody, subjected to

354. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
355. See supra note 176 and accompanying discussion.
356. See supra note 164-66 and accompanying text.
357. Id.
358.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

359.
360.
361.
362.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.(1966).
Id.
See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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questioning and compelled to be a witness against himself. While
the Bassiouni draft does state that the accused has the right to
remain silent, it does not state when the accused must be informed
of that right.3" Furthermore, the clause does not explicitly state
that such silence cannot be used against him.3"
In sum, while the draft proposal does provide some element of
due process' 6' such as the Investigative Division's hearing to
determine whether a complaint is "manifestly unfounded" and the
preliminary hearing to determine whether the case is reasonable,
the draft still falls short of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.
C. Trial Process

Bassiouni's draft provides that cases would be heard in public
by a three judge panel and deliberations would be in camera.3"
The accused will be entitled to certain rights such as equality of
arms, the presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy trial, the
right to question the legality of the obtained evidence, the right to
remain silent, the assistance of counsel during all the proceedings,
and the right to question whether the charges are based upon
reasonable grounds.367 The draft also recognizes defenses, justifi-

cations, exoneration, and claims of excusibility.36 Regarding
witnesses, a state can prohibit a resident witness from voluntarily
testifying before the ICC.369
Upon a determination of guilt, the draft proposal provides for
a separate hearing to impose sanctions.37 This hearing will allow
If
for evidence of mitigation and aggravation in sentencing."7
along
with
decision,
on
appeal,
that
the court en banc hears a case

363. Id.
364.
365.

Id.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the government not

deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The
central aim of this clause is to assure against arbitrary government actions and in
favor of fair procedures towards an individual. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, §
1.

366. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
367.

See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.

368. These include: self-defense; necessity; coercion; obedience to superior
orders; refusal to obey a superior order which constitutes a crime; mistake of law
or fact; double jeopardy; insanity; intoxicating or drugged condition; and

renunciation. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
371. Id.
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unappealed decisions will be final unless evidence unknown at the
time of the trial is discovered to materially affect the outcome of
the case, the court was flagrantly misled, the facts have not been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts proved do not
constitute a crime, or other grounds the court determines in its
rules. 37 2 Punishment can be imposed by the ICC or by the state-

party upon request of the ICC.
1. Comparison of Draft with Iranian Trial Process.- In
Iran, the litigants are the focal point in the courtroom. This differs
from the ICC in that the accused's attorney is the likely focal point
in the courtroom. This assumption is based on the fact that the
draft largely adopts civil and common law principles of procedure.373 Furthermore, in Iran, counsel is forbidden during prosecution of Hudud crimes.374 . This is unlike the ICC because an
attorney before the ICC is allowed to, be present for all. formal
proceedings, beginning at the preliminary hearing.37 5 Another
difference between a trial in Iran and one taking place inthe ICC
is the rules of evidence. Evidence in Iran is limited to eyewitness
testimony, confessions, and religious oaths.3 76 To be a qualified
witness in Iran, one must be a Muslim male, with certain exceptions
for the Muslim female.? The draft, while not including rules of
evidence, which are determined by the court, will likely not exclude
women and non-Muslims as witnesses. Since the draft will not
likely adopt the Iranian rules on witnesses, Iran may find the draft
rules overbroad and unacceptable. For example, the inherent
unreliability of a woman to be a witness, under Islamic law, may be
a large area of dissention.
In regard to using religious oaths as evidence, the ICC will
likely not adopt. such rules because of the religious diversity of its
jurisdictions. Excluding religious oaths as evidence during an ICC
trial may also result in another area of contention for Iranians.
During trial and sentencing, the Iranian system does allow for
generally similar defenses, justifications, and exonerations.379

372. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
373. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 46-49.
374. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
376. Id .
377. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
378. Id.
379. For example, criminal liability is avoided or limited where there is
intoxication, infancy, insanity, or other conditions such as coercion, necessity,
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Another difference between the Iranian trials and ICC trials
is that most decisions are unappealable in Iran."l Since the ICC
does provide for a number of ways to appeal, Iran may find this
aspect 'of the ICC too lax to be acceptable.
.2. Comparison of Draft with United States Trial Process.The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ...

public

'
trial."381
The Bassiouni draft satisfies the requirements of this
clause. The Sixth Amendment also gives any criminal defendant
382
"the' right. ., to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
While the draft does allow the defendant to be given effective ways
to challenge the evidence produced by the prosecution, it does not
explicitly say that the defendant has the right to cross-examine
hostile witnesses, an essential ingredient interpreted from the Sixth
Amendment's 'confrontation clause.3'
This ambiguity could
result in the loss of this protection for an American defendant.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Sixth Amendment also
provides a defendant with the right to a jury trial and denial of this
right in the ICC will present a clear conflict between United States
384
law 'and the ICC.
Each jurisdiction in the United States provides for a wide array
of exonerations defenses, excuses, justifications, and mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. Since these issues relate more to
substantive criminal law, it is sufficient to simply note for the
purposes of this paper, that the Bassiouni draft has similarly
allowed for some of these principles. As a result, draft provisions
may contribute to the overall fairness of the proceedings in the
eyes of the United States.
Another difference between the United States' trial process
and the ICC is that in the United States, if there is an acquittal, the

mistake, performance of a right or duty, or self-defense. LIPPMAN, supra note 208,
at 53-56; SCHACHT, supra note 208, at 182.
380. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
381. There is a limited exception to this rule if the defendant's right is
outweighed by a compelling state interest. This exception would be no broader
than necessary. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). This protections differs
from the ILA draft which appears to allows a broader rule for a private trial,
which is if necessary in the international public interest. See supra note 136.
382.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

383. This is unlike the ILA draft which explicitly states that a defendant has the
right to be heard and cross examine witnesses. See supra note 151.
384. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.

286

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:2

prosecution may not appeal because of the double jeopardy
clause.385 This is unlike the ICC which allows both parties to
appeal on questions of law.386 The order of the trial and evidentiary questions will not be discussed since the Bassiouni draft leaves
those issues open for the Tribunal to determine when formulating
rules of the court.3 7
D. ProceduralRights of the Accused
In the Bassiouni draft, the rights of the accused are the
fundamental human rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. These include the presumption of innocence,
equality of arms, speedy trial, evidentiary protections, the right to
remain silent, assistance of counsel, prohibition of arrest and
detention unless based on reasonable3s8 grounds, and protection of
the rights and interests of the victim.
1. Comparisonof Draftwith IranianProceduralRights.In
Iran, the fundamental principles upon which the procedural
protections are based are Islamic and, thus, such principles will not
be similar to a secular ICC. Another principle is that all free men
38 9
are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection.
This excludes women, children, and others who are not considered
"free." The ICC provides no such restrictions. Another difference
is that all decisions in Iran must conform to the Sharia. 3' The
ICC makes no claim to adopt Sharia Law. Iran also provides for
the right for the accused to remain silent and such silence cannot
be used as evidence of his guilt.391 However, the ICC only states
that the accused has the right to remain silent. This ambiguity
could severely harm the defense of the accused if the accused's
silence could be used as evidence of guilt.
The draft includes other protections, not in Sharia law, which
Iran may consider excessive protections and cause that nation to
not participate. The first is the equality of arms protection which
guarantees a defendant substantial parity when preparing a defense.

385. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
386.

See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.

387. Id.
388. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
389.

See supra note 294 and accompanying text.

390. Id.
391. Id.
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The second is the speedy trial provision which allows time for the
defendant to adequately prepare for trial. The right of the
defendant to adequately prepare for trial is a protection not
provided in Iran. Claims of swift trials and executions in the early
days of the revolution, led the Iranian government to slow the
entire trial process." However, giving the defendant adequate
time to prepare for trial does not appear to be a priority in the
Iranian system. Finally, unlike the draft, Iran has no protection
regarding arbitrary arrest and detention of an individual.
2. Comparison of Draft with United States.The United
States' fundamental procedural differences were discussed in earlier
sections, regarding the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
However, there are similarities between the procedures of the
United States and Bassiouni's draft which include the requirement
of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence within the
prosecution's possession.393 This protection is read into the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is
found in the draft clause of the ICC.3 94 This protection is stricter
in the draft, in that the defense must receive the information before
adjudication while the United States rules allows disclosure after
the start of trial.395
Another similarly provided protection between the United
States and Bassiouni's draft is the right to a speedy and public trial.
The Sixth Amendment requires in part that "In all criminal cases
the accused shall enjoy the right ...

to a speedy trial." The draft

also provides such protections without interfering with the
defendant's right to prepare for trial.396 Other similar protections
not previously mentioned are the presumption of innocence, the
right against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the guarantee
against double jeopardy.
Differing provisions between the draft protections and United
States' protections include the equality of arms right. 31 This
protection provides substantial parity in proceedings and procedures which include granting the accused effective ways to
challenge evidence produced by the prosecution and presenting a

392. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
393. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its prodigy.
394. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
395.
396.
397.

Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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defense. 398 This protection is not a United States constitutional
guarantee. While the United States does guarantee the right to
effective counsel,3 there is no right to equality of resources
between defense counsel and the prosecution. Another provision
which the ICC includes, that the United States does not provide, is
the right of the victim to participate in the proceedings and have
his civil interests protected." Other rights in the United States
not included in the ICC draft is the right not to be subjected to
excessive bail and the right to a grand jury."'
In sum, the only procedures that are required by the United
States constitution are those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
which are necessary to fundamental fairness.'
Thus, procedures
or lack of rights which violate this concept cannot be imposed.
While there are a number of similar rights between the ICC
and the United States, there are potential conflicts with rights seen
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution which may be considered too "fundamental" to ignore
by agreement with the ICC.
VI. Conclusion
The road to the establishment of an ICC has been very long.
However, with the increased dependence countries have on one
another and their mutual interests in criminality, the establishment
of such a court may still be a valid option. Furthermore, the weak
enforcement capabilities in multilateral treaties may also lead some
countries into supporting an ICC.
Nevertheless, as this article attempted to prove, countries may
not be willing to relinquish sovereignty and certain protections
afforded to their citizens. For example, Bassiouni's draft proposal
appeared too lax in some provisions and procedures, as compared
with Iran and the United States. While it is clear that disputes over
the rules of an ICC would be based upon differing grounds, both
countries would likely reject the draft proposal.

398.
399.

Id.
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).

400. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
401. These rights are not imposed upon the states, only in federal cases.
Although there is a good possibility that the right against excessive bail will be
extended to the states. 'Nevertheless, this may be an argument against imposing
such rights on an ICC. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
402. See Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46 (1947).
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The United States, one of the strongest nations of the world,
has the capabilities to enforce any violations it believes to be
committed against its country or citizens. This theory is similar to
Therethe theory behind the war trials after World War II'
fore, the need for an ICC would not be as great. Iran, a country
fairly isolated from Western principles, will only support an ICC if
more moderate leaders could influence the government to reject
support of a pure Islamic criminal system.
In sum, the Bassiouni draft leaves a number of procedural
protections ambiguous and, as a result, many other countries may
reject this proposal. Nonetheless, it is impossible for any draft
proposal of an ICC to meet the criminal justice standards of every
country. However, a system that will be predictable with detailed
provisions as provided by Bassiouni should create a solid draft
proposal for countries to seriously consider an ICC as a viable
option to the current methods of enforcing multilateral treaties.

403. See supra note 41.

